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Abstract
The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment
incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex
post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs.
Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A
party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party
is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership
structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the
standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from
trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction
costs.
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1 Introduction
Why are integrated rms sometimes more successful than non-integrated rms,
while in other instances the opposite holds true? Under which circumstances are
joint ventures a recommendable governance structure? In the past three decades,
questions along these lines have often been discussed by contract theorists in the
context of the property rights approach to the theory of the rm, which has been
developed in the pathbreaking contributions by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995).1
Consider a seller (A) and a buyer (B) of an intermediate product. Should
the seller own the relevant physical assets that are needed to produce the inter-
mediate good (non-integration) or should the buyer be the owner (integration)?
Might joint ownership, such that both parties have veto power over the use of
the assets, be a good idea? The property rights approach is focused on the role
of non-contractible investments that a party can make in its human capital (say,
at some initial date 0). After the investments are sunk, collaboration between
the parties becomes contractible and negotiations may occur (we will refer to
the negotiation phase as date 2). In the standard property rights model it is as-
sumed that once the investments are sunk there are no relevant transaction costs,
such that in line with the Coase Theorem negotiations always lead to an ex post
e¢ cient agreement. Specically, the parties divide the attainable surplus from
collaboration according to the Nash bargaining solution, where the threatpoint
is determined by the ownership structure. Asset ownership improves a partys
bargaining position and hence its incentives to invest. Prominent insights of the
property rights theory are that (i) if only one party has a relevant investment
decision, then this party should be the owner, and (ii) joint asset ownership is
never optimal.
In the present paper, we extend the standard property rights model by ex-
plicitly taking into account transaction costs that may restrain the parties from
reaching an e¢ cient agreement at date 2. Following an insightful paper by An-
derlini and Felli (2006), we model transaction costs in the most straightforward
way that one might imagine. Specically, at date 1 both parties simultaneously
1See Segal and Whinston (2012) for a recent literature review. A very crisp summary of
the literature is provided by Hart (2011).
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and independently have to decide whether to incur the relevant transaction costs
before the negotiations can take place. The negotiation phase (date 2) is reached
only if both parties pay their respective transaction costs.2 If at least one of the
parties decides not to incur its transaction costs such that the negotiations do
not start or if the negotiations do not lead to an agreement, then each party gets
its default payo¤ only. It turns out that in the presence of transaction costs,
some of the main conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned.
In particular, (i) ownership by the non-investing party and (ii) joint ownership
can be optimal.
In a rst step, let us assume that there is no investment decision to be made.
In line with the standard property rights approach, let the default payo¤s depend
on the ownership structure as follows. Suppose the seller is the sole owner (A-
ownership). Even if no agreement is reached, the seller can make a positive prot
(say, ). Since she owns the necessary assets, she can produce the intermediate
good and use it herself to produce a nal good. Yet, in the absence of the buyers
human capital (i.e., the buyers specic abilities to produce the nal good), her
prot will be smaller than the date-2 surplus that the parties could generate
together (which we denote by V ). Since the buyer has no access to the necessary
assets, he makes zero prots when no agreement is reached. Next, consider sole
ownership by the buyer (B-ownership). If no agreement is reached, the buyer can
produce the intermediate good himself, because he has access to the assets. Yet,
the buyer lacks the sellers specic knowledge, hence the buyers prot (say, )
will be smaller than the surplus that the parties could realize by collaboration.
As the seller has no access to the assets, she makes zero prots. Finally, suppose
that there is joint ownership, such that each party has veto power over the use of
the assets. Since no party can use the asset without the other partiesconsent,
in this case the default payo¤s of both parties are zero.
If the negotiation stage is reached, suppose that bargaining leads to the reg-
ular Nash bargaining solution; i.e., each party gets its default payo¤ plus half of
the gains from trade (where the gains from trade equal the collaboration surplus
2As discussed in detail by Anderlini and Felli (2006), the transaction costs may be inter-
preted as the time spent preparing for the negotiations. For instance, the parties need to
conceive of a suitable language to describe the states of nature, they must collect information
about the legal environment, they need to spend time arranging a way to meet, etc.
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V minus the sum of the default payo¤s). At date 1, a party is willing to incur
its transaction costs only if they are smaller than half of the gains from trade.
Clearly, if the transaction costs are so large that negotiations will never occur,
the optimal ownership structure is the one that leads to the largest sum of the
default payo¤s. Without loss of generality, let us suppose that  > , such that
A-ownership is the uniquely optimal ownership structure for large transaction
costs. It is now interesting to note that for small transaction costs, B-ownership
may be better than A-ownership, and joint ownership may be uniquely optimal.
The reason is that the gains from trade are larger in the case of B-ownership
(and even more so in the case of joint ownership) than they are in the case of
A-ownership, so the parties are actually least inclined to pay their transaction
costs in the case of A-ownership. Specically, the optimality of B-ownership or
joint ownership requires that (in the wording of Anderlini and Felli, 2006) there
is a mismatchbetween the distribution of the surplus (50:50 in the case of the
regular Nash bargaining solution) and the distribution of the transaction costs
(i.e., the two parties must have di¤erent transaction costs).3 Yet, such a mis-
matchis not a prerequisite for the optimality of B-ownership or joint ownership
once we allow for investments.
In our full-edged model, party A rst can decide how much to invest in
its human capital (date 0). Following the literature on the property rights ap-
proach, we assume that the investment increases the collaboration surplus more
than party As default payo¤.4 After the investment is sunk, each party decides
whether to incur its respective transaction cost (date 1). Finally, if both parties
have paid their transaction costs, negotiations take place (date 2). In the stan-
dard property rights model (i.e., if there were no transaction costs), A-ownership
would be the uniquely optimal ownership structure, as it would maximize party
As incentives to invest. Yet, we will show that in the presence of transaction
costs, partyAs investment may well be larger underB-ownership and under joint
3The reason is that when both parties have the same transaction costs, then under A-
ownership both parties can recoup their transaction costs whenever their sum is smaller than
V  ; i.e., whenever reaching an agreement is e¢ cient. Thus, B-ownership or joint ownership
cannot be strictly better than A-ownership, because A-ownership already yields the largest
attainable total surplus, regardless of whether or not an agreement is reached.
4Specically, the collaboration surplus now is V  (1 + I), while party As default payo¤
under A-ownership is   (1 + I), where I is the investment level chosen by party A.
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ownership. Intuitively, the fact that B-ownership and in particular joint owner-
ship are so unattractive when no agreement is reached implies that paying the
transaction costs may be an equilibrium outcome under these ownership struc-
tures, even when under A-ownership the negotiation phase would not be reached.
Hence, B-ownership and joint ownership may prevent ex post ine¢ ciencies and
provide stronger investment incentives for party A. As a consequence, we nd
that B-ownership may yield a larger total surplus than A-ownership, and joint
ownership may turn out to be the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
Empirically, our nding that joint ownership can be uniquely optimal in sus-
tainable relationships when transaction costs are relatively high is in line with
the observation that joint ventures are particularly prevalent in the context of
complex R&D activities.5 For instance, in the empirical literature Pisano (1989)
reports that rms are more likely to form equity joint ventures when R&D has to
be performed in the course of their collaboration (as opposed to other functions
such as manufacturing or marketing). Oxley and Sampson (2004) also point out
that joint ventures are often observed when alliance objectives require partners
to share complex and/or tacit knowledge, especially in technologically innovative
projects. Under such circumstances transaction costs are likely to be larger than
in more standard situations, where the usual conclusions of the property rights
theory hold.6
Related literature. Inspired by Coases (1937) famous article on the nature of
the rm, the property rights approach has been devised in the seminal papers
by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and was synthesized
by Hart (1995). The by now standard property rights models have recently been
criticized by Tadelis and Williamson (2012) for being too focused on ex ante
investment incentives, while in practice mitigating ex post ine¢ ciencies may
also be an important role of governance structures. In our model, we explicitly
5For an empirical study that conrms the close relationship between the notion of joint
ownership in the property rights theory and characteristics of joint ventures in practice, see
Gattai and Natale (2013).
6See also Oxley (1997), who nds that equity joint ventures are more likely to be observed
in the case of product or process design than in the case of production or marketing activities.
Emphasizing the substantial investments in the exploration of new technologies and processes,
Sampson (2004) also highlights the role of high transaction costs in the context of complex
R&D activities (see also Croisier, 1998).
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take transaction costs into account and explore the implications of the di¤erent
ownership structures on the ex post negotiations.7 Hence, our contribution may
help to somewhat broaden the bridge between the property rights approach and
traditional transaction costs economics.8
We model transaction costs following Anderlini and Felli (2006).9 While
they do not study ex ante investments, in section 5 of their paper they also
briey consider the role of property rights. Yet, their model di¤ers from the
standard property rights approach to the theory of the rm and they focus their
attention on a specic range of parameters (see our detailed discussion at the end
of section 2). Thus, in their framework they nd that the ownership structure
which leads to the largest sum of the default payo¤s (i.e., A-ownership in our
setup) is always optimal, provided that the negotiations are modeled by the Nash
bargaining solution in the usual way.10
The property rights approach has also been criticized because the standard
model cannot explain joint ownership. For instance, Holmström (1999) has em-
phasized that joint ventures have always been an important part of the corporate
landscape, and that thus the prediction of the standard property rights model
according to which joint ownership is never optimal seems to be counterfactual.
7While explicit transaction costs might be the most straightforward way to allow for ex post
ine¢ ciencies, there are of course alternatives. For example, Schmitz (2006) and Goldlücke and
Schmitz (2014) assume that an agents default payo¤ is better known to herself than to the
other party, such that negotiations may fail due to asymmetric information. Hart and Moore
(2008) and Hart (2009) introduce behavioral assumptions according to which an agent may
engage in ine¢ cient shading activities when she is aggrieved (which happens when she does
not get what she feels entitled to). See also Herweg and Schmidt (2015) for a model with
ine¢ cient renegotiation based on loss aversion.
8On the relation between the property rights theory and traditional transaction costs eco-
nomics, see also Holmström and Roberts (1998), Williamson (2002), and Whinston (2003).
9For more general denitions of transaction costs, see Malin and Martimort (2002).
10In the property rights approach to the theory of the rm, the parties default payo¤s
are usually considered to constitute the threatpoint of the Nash bargaining solution (i.e., the
surplus is divided according to the split-the-di¤erence rule). DeMeza and Lockwood (1998) and
Chiu (1998) consider an alternative way to model the negotiations (the deal-me-out solution,
where the default payo¤s act as a constraint on the bargaining set). For non-cooperative
foundations of the alternative bargaining outcomes, see e.g. Chiu and Yang (1999) and the
textbook by Muthoo (1999).
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Our paper adds to the literature that looks for possible explanations of joint
ownership within the property rights paradigm.11 In particular, the intuition
behind our results is somewhat related to Halonen (2002).12 She considers an
innitely repeated game and argues that joint ownership can be desirable as it
may help to sustain cooperative behavior. Specically, the fact that joint owner-
ship is suboptimal in a one-shot setting means that it can aggravate punishments
for deviations from cooperative behavior (which trigger reversion to the stage-
game equilibrium). In contrast, we stay within the usual one-shot setup of the
property rights theory and in our model the fact that joint ownership leads to
unattractive default payo¤s is turned to an advantage because larger gains from
trade increase the partieswillingness to incur the transaction costs.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In section 2, the basic model without investments is introduced. In section 3,
our main results are derived in a property rights model with non-contractible
investment. Concluding remarks follow in section 4. All formal proofs have been
relegated to the appendix.
2 The basic model
There are two agents, A and B, who at some future date t = 2 can agree to
collaborate in order to generate a surplus of size V > 0. In case of negotiations
not taking place or no agreement being reached, at date t = 2 each party i 2
fA;Bg obtains only its default payo¤ doi  0, where o 2 fA;B; Jg denotes the
ownership structure. The ownership structure species either agent i to be the
owner, o = i 2 fA;Bg, or joint ownership, o = J . In line with the property rights
approach to the theory of the rm, we assume that in the case of sole ownership
by party A or party B, the owners default payo¤ is positive but smaller than
V , while the non-owners default payo¤ is zero. In the case of joint ownership,
11Other explanations of joint ownership include investments in physical capital (Hart, 1995,
pp. 6869), multidimensional investments (Cai, 2003, and Rosenkranz and Schmitz, 2003),
and asymmetric information (Schmitz, 2008). See also Gattai and Natale (2015) for a recent
literature review.
12See also the related work on repeated games by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) and
Halonen-Akatwijuka and Palis (2009).
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each party has veto power such that both partiesdefault payo¤s are zero.13 The
partiesdefault payo¤s under the di¤erent ownership structures are summarized
in Table 1.14 We assume that V >  >  > 0.
doA d
o
B
o = A  0
o = B 0 
o = J 0 0
Table 1. The partiesdefault payo¤s.
In case of negotiations taking place and an agreement being reached, the value
V is generated. The division of this value between the two agents is determined
according to the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where  2 [0; 1] and 1 
denote agent As and agent Bs bargaining power, respectively. Specically,
suppose that agent B obtains the full value V . Then the transfer T paid from
agent B to agent A solves15
max
T
(T   doA)(V   T   doB)1 :
In consequence, if negotiations lead to an agreement, agent As payo¤ is
T = doA + (V   doA   doB)
and agent Bs payo¤ is
V   T = doB + (1  )(V   doA   doB):
Thus, each agent receives her default payo¤ plus a share of the gains from trade
(i.e., the available surplus over and above the sum of the default payo¤s).
13We thus dene joint ownership in the same way as it is usually done in the literature on
the property rights approach (see Hart, 1995).
14In the Supplementary Material we illustrate that similar insights can also be gained in
frameworks with ownership structures in which a party may own only a subset of the assets,
so the party has to trade with alternative partners on the market (possibly requiring further
transaction costs) when no agreement is reached.
15For a comprehensive exposition of bargaining theory, see Muthoo (1999).
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For negotiations to take place, however, at date t = 1 each agent i 2 fA;Bg
has to pay a transaction cost ci > 0. The agents reach the negotiation stage only
if both agents pay their respective transaction costs. We thus model transaction
costs in the same way as Anderlini and Felli (2006).
To summarize, the two agents engage in the following two-stage game. At
date t = 1, the agents simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to
pay the transaction cost cA and cB. At date t = 2, if both agents have paid their
respective transaction costs, the agents can negotiate an agreement that yields
a value of V . If an agreement is reached, agent B obtains value V and pays
transfer T to agent A. If no agreement is reached at date t = 2 or if at least
one agent did not pay her transaction cost at date t = 1, then at date t = 2
agent i receives her default payo¤ doi . The solution concept is subgame-perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Analysis of the model. Suppose that both parties have paid their transaction
costs ci at date t = 1, such that negotiations take place at date t = 2. Then an
agreement will be reached and party As payo¤ is doA + (V   doA   doB)   cA,
while party Bs payo¤ is doB + (1  )(V   doA   doB)  cB. If at least one party
does not pay the transaction costs at date t = 1, then the negotiations do not
take place and each party gets its default payo¤ at date t = 2. Hence, at date
t = 1 the two agents play the simultaneous move game shown in Figure 1.
For negotiations to take place, however, at date t = 1 each agent i 2 fA;Bg
has to pay a transaction cost ci > 0. The agents reach the negotiation stage only
if both agents pay their respective transaction costs. We thus model transaction
costs in the same way as Anderlini and Felli (2006).
To summarize, the two agents engage in the following two-stage game. At
date t = 1, the agents simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to
pay the transaction cost cA and cB. At date t = 2, if both agents have paid their
respective transaction costs, the agents can negotiate an agreement that yields
a value of V . If an agreement is reached, agent B obtains value V and pays
transfer T to agent A. If no agreement is reached at date t = 2 or if at least
one agent did not pay her transaction cost at date t = 1, then at date t = 2
agent i receives her default payo¤ doi . The solution concept is subgame-perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies.
Analysis of the model. Suppose that both parties have paid their transaction
costs ci at date t = 1, such that negotiations take place at date t = 2. Then an
agreement will be reached and party As payo¤ is doA + (V   doA   doB)   cA,
while party Bs payo¤ is doB + (1  )(V   doA   doB)  cB. If at least one party
does not pay the transaction costs at date t = 1, then the negotiations do not
take place and each party gets its default payo¤ at date t = 2. Hence, at date
t 1 the t o agents play the si ultaneous move game shown in Figure 1.
pay cB dont pay cB
pay cA
doA + (V   doA   doB)  cA
doB + (1  )(V   doA   doB)  cB
doA   cA
doB
dont pay cA
doA
doB   cB
doA
doB
Figure 1. The normal-form game played at date t = 1. Agent A chooses
a row, while agent B chooses a column. In each cell, agent As payo¤ is
displayed above agent Bs payo¤.
If an agent does not pay the transaction cost, it is the best response for the
other agent also not to pay the transaction cost. Thus, neither agent paying
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displayed above agent Bs payo¤.
If an agent does not pay the transaction cost, it is the best response for the
other agent also not to pay the transaction cost. Thus, neither agent paying
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the transaction cost always is an equilibrium of the game. In particular, if some
agent is transaction cost exceeds her share of the gains from trade, i.e., if cA >
(V doA doB) or cB > (1 )(V doA doB), then the aforementioned equilibrium is
the unique equilibrium of the game because not paying ci is a strictly dominant
strategy for agent i. If, on the other hand, cA  (V   doA   doB) and cB 
(1   )(V   doA   doB), then the game has a second equilibrium in which both
agents pay their transaction costs.
Whenever the equilibrium (pay cA, pay cB) exists, then it Pareto-dominates
the equilibrium (dont pay cA, dont pay cB); i.e., each agents payo¤ in the
former equilibrium weakly exceeds her default payo¤ and (except for the knife-
edge case where cA= = cB=(1   ) = V   doA   doB) at least one of the agents
is strictly better o¤. It is a standard assumption in contract theory that under
such circumstances, agents coordinate on the Pareto-superior equilibrium. Thus,
whenever it exists, we assume that the equilibrium (pay cA, pay cB) is played.
In particular, in line with Anderlini and Felli (2006), in the remainder of the
paper we suppose that the agents coordinate on Pareto-perfect equilibria; i.e.,
we require that in every subgame an equilibrium is played which is not strictly
Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium of the same subgame.16
Let the total surplus generated under a given ownership structure be denoted
by S(o). Whenever the equilibrium (pay cA, pay cB) is played, then the total
surplus equals the net surplus from reaching an agreement, V   cA   cB. If,
however, for a given ownership structure the equilibrium (dont pay cA, dont
pay cB) is the unique equilibrium, then the total surplus equals the sum of the
agentsdefault payo¤s in that ownership structure.
Lemma 1 Consider ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg.
(i) If cA  (V   doA   doB) and cB  (1   )(V   doA   doB), then S(o) =
V   cA   cB.
(ii) If cA > (V  doA doB) or cB > (1 )(V  doA doB), then S(o) = doA+doB.
16For a detailed discussion of Pareto perfection, see Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston (1987)
and Benoît and Krishna (1993). Alternatively, as has also been pointed out by Anderlini and
Felli (2006), we could modify the timing such that the parties have to pay their transaction
costs sequentially (in this case there would be no multiplicity of equilibria and the same results
would be obtained as under Pareto perfection).
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An optimal ownership structure o maximizes the total surplus generated;
i.e., o 2 O := arg maxo2fA;B;Jg S(o).
With  > , the sum of the default payo¤s is maximized under A-ownership
and in this case equals . Therefore, whenever V  cA cB < , then A-ownership
is optimal, which results in the equilibrium (dont pay cA, dont pay cB) and thus
payo¤ dAi for agent i 2 fA;Bg.
If V   cA   cB  , then the total surplus would be maximized if each agent
pays her respective transaction cost and negotiations take place, in which case an
agreement is reached. An agent is willing to incur the transaction cost, however,
only if her share of the gains from trade (i.e., the value from agreement minus
the sum of default payo¤s) exceeds her transaction cost. Noting that the gains
from trade are minimal under A-ownership and maximal under joint ownership
leads to the following characterization of the optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 1 (i) Suppose that V   cA   cB < . Then O = fAg.
(ii) Suppose that V   cA   cB > .
(a) If cA  (V   ) and cB  (1  )(V   ), then O = fA;B; Jg.
(b) If (V  ) < cA  (V  ) or (1 )(V  ) < cB  (1 )(V  ),
then O = fB; Jg.
(c) If (V   ) < cA  V or (1   )(V   ) < cB  (1   )V , then
O = fJg.
(d) If V < cA or (1  )V < cB, then O = fAg.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let us take a closer look at part (ii) of Proposition 1. Note that any ownership
structure that leads to both agents paying the transaction costs and thus the
maximum surplus V   cA   cB to be generated is optimal. If the gains from
trade are too small even under joint ownership for one of the agents to recoup
her transaction cost, case (d), then this agent will never be willing to pay her
transaction cost irrespective of the ownership structure. With negotiations not
taking place under any ownership structure, the optimal ownership structure
maximizes the sum of the agentsdefault payo¤s. Hence, A-ownership is optimal.
If, on the other hand, both agents can recoup their respective transaction costs
even under A-ownership where gains from trade are minimal, case (a), then both
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agents can recoup the transaction cost also under any other ownership structure.
Hence, negotiations will take place and the maximum surplus will be achieved
irrespective of the ownership structure, such that all ownership structures are
equally e¢ cient.
Regarding cases (b) and (c), from V   cA   cB >  it follows that if agent i
cannot recoup her transaction cost ci under some specic ownership structure ~o,
then agent j 6= i can recoup her transaction cost cj under ownership structure
~o and any ownership structure that leads to higher gains from trade than ~o.
Hence, if some agent cannot cover her transaction cost under A-ownership but
under B-ownership (and thus also under joint ownership), case (b), then both
B-ownership and joint ownership achieve the maximum surplus and thus are
optimal. Likewise, if some agent cannot cover her transaction cost under B-
ownership (and thus also not under A-ownership) but under joint ownership,
case (c), then only joint ownership achieves the maximum surplus and thus is
the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
V − α
V − α
(1− λ)V
(1− λ)(V − β)
(1− λ)(V − α)
cB
cA
λVλ(V − β)λ(V − α)
O = {B, J}
O = {J}
O = {A}
O = {A,B, J}
cB = V − α− cA
λV − α
V
2
V−β
2
V−α
2
ψ˜AJ ψ˜AB
c
ψ
c˜J(ψ)
c˜B(ψ)
c˜A(ψ)
IB ≤ IJ < IA
IB < IA < IJ
IA < IB = IJ
1
Figure 2. Optimal ownership structures.
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Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2.17 Consider the case in which it would
be e¢ cient for the parties to reach an agreement, such that cB lies below the curve
V     cA. Anderlini and Felli (2006) have pointed out that if the distribution
of the transaction costs is su¢ ciently mis-matchedwith the distribution of the
surplus (in Figure 2, this is the case when cB > (1 )V and thus cA < V  ),
then negotiations do not take place and the optimal ownership structure maxi-
mizes the sum of the default payo¤s (in our case, this means that A-ownership
is optimal).18 Yet, what is important to observe is the fact that the ownership
structure also matters if cB is smaller than (1 )V , which has not been studied
by Anderlini and Felli (2006). In particular, it is interesting to note that then
there are parameter regions where A-ownership is strictly worse than o = B and
o = J . Intuitively, the gains from trade are larger under o = B than under
o = A. Hence, the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs under
B-ownership than under A-ownership. Analogously, the parties are even more
willing to incur the transaction costs under joint ownership. For this reason,
o = J may be the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
Note that in order for A-ownership to be strictly dominated by o = B or
o = J , we need a mismatchbetween the distribution of the transaction costs
(cA, cB) and the distribution of the surplus which is determined by the parties
bargaining powers (, 1   ). In the symmetric case where cA = cB =: c and
 = 1=2, Proposition 1(i) implies that A-ownership is optimal for V   2c < ,
while Proposition 1(ii)(a) implies that all ownership structures are optimal for
V   2c > .19 Thus, in the symmetric case, A-ownership is always optimal.
Corollary 1 Suppose that  = 1=2 and cA = cB. Then A 2 O.
In contrast, in the following section we will demonstrate that even in the
symmetric case the presence of transaction costs can have interesting implications
17In the gure, we depict the case where maxf(V   )=V; =V g <  < (V   )=(V   ).
18Anderlini and Felli (2006) assume that the default payo¤s can be freely chosen, provided
they add up to zero. This is somewhat unusual in the property rights approach, where typically
an exogenous set of ownership structures is considered. Note that if default payo¤s could indeed
be negative and freely chosen without the restriction of adding up to zero, the parties could
always ensure that negotiations take place and an agreement is reached.
19It is straightforward to see that O = fA;B; Jg must also hold in the knife-edge case
V   2c = .
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for the (sub-)optimality of A-ownership when we take incentives to make non-
contractible investments into account.
3 Transaction costs and investment incentives
We now consider a full-edged property rights model with an ex ante investment
stage and explore the implications that the introduction of transaction costs has
for the optimal ownership structure. Specically, let us consider the following
extension of our basic model.
Suppose that at date t = 0 agent A can make a non-contractible investment
I  0 at cost K(I), where K(0) = K 0(0) = 0, K 0 > 0 for I > 0, K 00 > 0,
K 000  0, and limI!1K 0(I) = 1. In line with the property rights approach
(cf. Hart, 1995), agent A can invest in her human capital. Thus, the e¤ect of the
investment is twofold. First, the investment a¤ects the value generated in case
of both agents paying the transaction costs and reaching an agreement; i.e., the
date-2 surplus in case of collaboration is now given by V  (1 + I). Second, the
investment also a¤ects agent As default payo¤ in case of A-ownership. Formally,
dAA(I) = (1+I) and dBA = dJA = 0, where we still assume that 0 <  < V . Thus,
in case agent A does not invest at all, i.e., for I = 0, the value from cooperation
and agent As default payo¤ equal V and , respectively, just as in the baseline
model without ex ante investment. Agent Bs default payo¤ is una¤ected by
agent As investment in her human capital; i.e., dAB = d
J
B = 0 <  = d
B
B. The
default payo¤s are summarized in Table 2.
As before, we assume that  < , which ensures that if no agreement is
reached, o = A maximizes the date-2 total surplus, regardless of the investment
level. Moreover, in order to simplify the exposition we also assume that V > 2,
which means that agent A making the investment leads to a su¢ ciently large
increase in the value of reaching an agreement relative to the increase in agent
As default payo¤. As will become clear below, we thus restrict our attention to
the most interesting cases with regard to the optimal ownership structure.
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doA(I) d
o
B
o = A (1 + I) 0
o = B 0 
o = J 0 0
Table 2. The partiesdefault payo¤s with ex ante investment.
In accordance with the property rights approach, the investment decision
of agent A becomes observable for agent B between dates t = 0 and t = 1.20
Thereafter, events unfold as in the baseline model. Thus, at date t = 1 both
agents simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to pay their respec-
tive transaction costs; if both agents have paid their transactions costs, then at
date t = 2 negotiations take place.
In the absence of transaction costs (cA = cB = 0), we have a standard
property rights model in the tradition of Grossman and Hart (1986), in which
o = A is the uniquely optimal ownership structure (since agreement is always
reached and investment incentives are maximized when agent As default payo¤
in the negotiations is as large as possible).21
In the remainder of the paper, following most of the literature on the property
rights approach,22 we assume that the negotiations lead to the regular Nash
bargaining solution; i.e., both parties have the same bargaining power,  = 1=2.
Moreover, we also assume that both parties have the same transaction costs, cA =
cB =: c. Hence, in the wording of Anderlini and Felli (2006), the distribution of
the transaction costs is not mis-matchedwith the distribution of the surplus.
Recall that in the baseline model without investment (I  0), A-ownership is
always optimal in this symmetric case (see Corollary 1).23
20In the Supplementary Material we illustrate that our main insights can also be obtained
in a model where party B can observe party As investment only after party B has incurred
its transaction costs cB .
21The formal proof of this result is a special case of our analysis below.
22See e.g. the seminal work by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1995), and Hart, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997).
23It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case of asymmetric bargaining powers.
In the Supplementary Material we show that then joint ownership can yield a larger total
surplus than A-ownership even when the transaction costs are small.
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Hence, we have stacked the deck in favor of A-ownership. If either the trans-
action costs are zero or there is no investment decision to be made, then A-
ownership is optimal. As a consequence, when we will nd that o = B or o = J
is strictly better than o = A, then this result must follow from the interplay of
the transaction costs with the investment decision.
3.1 Investment incentives
Consider ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg. Suppose agent A has invested
amount I  0 at date t = 0. In analogy to the baseline model, it is straightfor-
ward to see that at date t = 1 both agents paying the transaction cost c is an
equilibrium if and only if c  1
2
[V (1 + I)   doA(I)   doB] or, equivalently, if and
only if agent As investment is su¢ ciently high,
I  ~Io := 2c+ d
o
B
V   Io   1;
where Io is an indicator function with
Io =
(
1 if o = A;
0 if o 2 fB; Jg:
(1)
Thus, if agent A invests below ~Io, then neither agent will pay the transaction
costs and agent As utility equals her default payo¤ minus the investment cost,
uoA(I) := Io(1 + I) K(I):
If, on the other hand, agent As investment exceeds ~Io, then both agents will pay
the transaction costs and agent As utility equals her default payo¤ plus half the
gains from trade minus the transaction cost minus the investment cost,
uoA(I) :=
1
2
[(1 + I)(V + Io)  doB]  c K(I):
Dene
I
o
:= arg max
I0
uoA(I) = 

V + Io
2

and Io := arg max
I0
uoA(I) =  (Io) ;
where ()  K 0 1() denotes the inverse of the marginal investment cost function
K 0(). One can show that agent As maximum utility when both agents pay
the transaction costs exceeds her maximum utility when neither agent pays the
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transaction costs if and only if the transaction costs are su¢ ciently small; i.e.,
there exists ~co such that uoA(I
o
) R uoA(Io) if and only if c Q ~co. Furthermore, it
can be shown that c < ~co implies I
o
> ~Io and that c > ~co implies Io < ~Io. Thus,
agent As investment behavior under ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg can be
characterized as follows.
Lemma 2 For o 2 fA;B; Jg, there exists a threshold ~co such that agent As
optimal level of investment is given by
Io =
(

 
V+Io
2

if c  ~co;
 (Io) if c > ~co:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that (0) = 0, such that IB = IJ = 0; i.e., under ownership structures
o = B and o = J , if agent A prefers to invest such that transaction costs will
not be paid, then he will not invest at all because his default payo¤ is zero under
these ownership structures.
Furthermore, note that ~cB < ~cJ must hold because, intuitively, while agent
As optimal investment is the same for o = B and o = J in case that both agents
are willing to pay the transaction costs, the gains from trade generated by this
investment are strictly lower under B-ownership (because of agent Bs strictly
positive default payo¤). In consequence, the maximum level of transaction costs
being compatible with both agents actually paying these transaction costs is
higher under joint ownership than under B-ownership.
3.2 The optimal ownership structure
Under ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg, if c  ~co, then the gains from trade
given agent As optimal investment are su¢ ciently high for both agents to recoup
their transaction costs such that the negotiations take place. If c > ~co, on the
other hand, then the gains from trade under agent As optimal investment are
too low for both agents to recoup their respective transaction costs such that the
agents are not willing to pay these transaction costs in the rst place.
From Lemma 2 it follows that when our assumptions hold then agent As
investment under an ownership structure under which negotiations take place is
always larger than under an ownership structure under which the transaction
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costs are not paid, maxo2fA;B;Jg Io < mino2fA;B;Jg I
o
. Hence, Lemma 2 implies
the following result.
Proposition 2 (i) If maxf~cA; ~cBg < c  ~cJ , then IB < IA < IJ .
(ii) If ~cA < c  ~cB, then IA < IB = IJ .
(iii) Otherwise, IB  IJ < IA.
To impose somewhat more structure on the analysis of investment incentives
under the alternative ownership arrangements, we make the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 1 Let K(I) =  k(I) with  > 0, k(0) = k0(0) = 0, k0 > 0 for
I > 0, k00 > 0, k000  0, and limI!1 k0(I) =1.
The following lemma summarizes important characteristics of the thresholds
~co, which, given that Assumption 1 holds, are continuous functions of the invest-
ment cost parameter  ; i.e., ~co = ~co( ).
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
(i) The threshold ~co( ) is strictly decreasing in  , with lim !1 ~co( ) = (V  
doA(0)  doB)=2, for each o 2 fA;B; Jg.
(ii) There exist critical values ~ 
AJ
and ~ 
AB  ~ AJ such that  > ~ AJ )
~cA( ) < ~cJ( ) and  > ~ 
AB ) ~cA( ) < ~cB( ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Part (i) of Lemma 3 says that the critical level of transaction costs above
which negotiations do not take place decreases in the investment cost parameter
 . Intuitively, as each unit of the investment becomes more costly, agent As op-
timal investment in case that both agents subsequently pay the transaction costs
decreases. Since this decrease in investment decreases the gains from trade, the
maximum level of transaction cost for which both agents are willing to actually
pay the transaction costs also decreases.
With regard to part (ii) of Lemma 3, for high values of the investment cost
parameter the maximum level of transaction costs for which negotiations take
place is lowest under A-ownership. Intuitively, in this case, where investments
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are very small under any ownership structure, the fact that for a given investment
level the gains from trade are larger under B-ownership and maximal under joint
ownership overcompensates the stronger incentives to invest under A-ownership.
The critical thresholds ~co( ) are illustrated in Figure 3 as a function of the
investment cost parameter  for the case of a quadratic investment cost func-
tion.24
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c
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Figure 3. Optimal investment levels for K(I) =  I2=2.
Recall that in the standard property rights model without transaction costs
(c = 0), agent As investment incentives can never be larger under o = B or
o = J than under A-ownership. In contrast, as illustrated in Figure 3 and
in accordance with Proposition 2(ii), when there are positive transaction costs,
then B-ownership can induce agent A to choose a larger investment level than
she would do under o = A. The reason is that for a given investment level the
gains from trade are larger under o = B than under o = A, such that it may
happen that both agents paying the transaction costs is an equilibrium under
o = B but not under o = A. Similarly, in accordance with Proposition 2(i), it
may even be the case that joint ownership leads to a larger investment level than
24Thus, k(I) = 12I
2. In this case, ~ 
AJ
= 12
 
V   32

and ~ 
AB
= ~ 
AJ
=(   ). Further-
more, ~cA( ) R ~cJ( ) if and only if  Q ~ AJ and ~cA( ) R ~cB( ) if and only if  Q ~ AB . All
calculations for the case of a quadratic cost function are provided in the proof of Corollary 2.
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both o = A and o = B, because not reaching an agreement is most unattractive
under o = J , such that the agents may be most willing to incur the transaction
costs under joint ownership.
As before, let the total surplus under ownership structure o 2 fA;B; Jg be
denoted by S(o). If the transaction costs are su¢ ciently small such that in
equilibrium they are incurred by both agents, then the total surplus equals the
value generated by negotiation minus twice the transaction costs minus agent As
investment costs. On the other hand, if the agents do not pay the transaction
costs, then the total surplus equals the sum of the agentsdefault payo¤s minus
agent As investment costs. Formally,
S(o) =
(
V (1 + Io)  2c K(Io) if c  ~co;
doA(I
o) + doB  K(Io) if c > ~co:
If the transaction costs are rather low and thus paid by both agents irrespec-
tive of the ownership structure, i.e. if c  minf~cA; ~cBg, then agent As optimal
investment level is strictly higher under A-ownership than under B-ownership or
joint ownership, IA > IJ = IB. Since the total surplus is a concave function of
the investment level and there is always underinvestment with regard to the rst-
best benchmark,25 the ownership structure that leads to the largest investment
level is optimal. In consequence, A-ownership is the uniquely optimal ownership
structure in this case.
Likewise, if transaction costs are relatively high, i.e. if c > maxf~cA; ~cJg,
then neither agent pays the transaction costs. While not investing at all under
B-ownership or joint ownership, agent A makes a strictly positive investment
under A-ownership because of the investments favorable e¤ect on her default
payo¤. Thus, A-ownership again provides maximum investment incentives and
therefore is the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
As we have seen, however, there may be cases in which the agents are willing
to pay the transaction costs under joint ownership (and possibly also under B-
ownership) but not under A-ownership, such that agent A no longer makes the
largest investment under A-ownership. It thus stands to reason that the optimal
ownership structure not necessarily gives ownership to the investing agent A,
25The rst-best investment level conditional on transaction costs being paid is given by
IFB = argmaxI0 V (1 + I)  2c K(I) = (V ).
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because joint ownership or B-ownership may avoid ex post ine¢ ciencies and
provide stronger investment incentives. Specically, in these cases o = A is
suboptimal if the transaction costs (which are incurred under o = B and o = J
only) are not too large, as stated formally in the following result.
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
(i) There exists a threshold ~cS( ) such that for ~cA( ) < c  ~co( ) with
o 2 fB; Jg, we have S(o) R S(A) () c Q ~cS( ). The threshold ~cS( ) is
strictly decreasing, with lim !1 ~cS( ) = (V   )=2.
(ii) There exists a critical value ~ > 0 such that for  < ~ we have ~cA( ) <
~cS( ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemmas 3 and 4 together imply that as long as  is su¢ ciently small and
marginal investment costs are su¢ ciently high, there always exists an interme-
diate range of transaction costs for which A-ownership is strictly inferior to B-
ownership and joint ownership.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and that  < ~. For o 2 fB; Jg,
if  > ~ 
Ao
, we have ~cA( ) < minf~cS( ); ~co( )g and, thus, S(o) > S(A) for
c 2 (~cA( );minf~cS( ); ~co( )g).
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the case of a quadratic investment cost function, the optimal allocation
of ownership in our model with ex ante investment can be fully characterized as
follows.
Corollary 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds with k(I) = 1
2
I2. Furthermore, sup-
pose V > (2 +
p
2).
(i) If maxf~cA( ); ~cB( )g < c < minf~cJ( ); ~cS( )g or ~cA < c = ~cJ < ~cS, then
O = fJg.
(ii) If ~cA( ) < c < minf~cB( ); ~cS( )g or ~cA < c = ~cB < ~cS, then O = fB; Jg.
(iii) Otherwise, A 2 O.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Figure 4. Optimal ownership with ex ante investment for K(I) =  I2=2.
Corollary 2 is illustrated in Figure 4. In the standard property rights model
without transaction costs (c = 0), A-ownership must be optimal, because agree-
ment is always reached and agent As incentives to invest are larger under o = A
than under o = B or o = J . Yet, when there are positive transaction costs,
then ownership by the non-investing party B may be better than A-ownership.
Moreover, joint ownership may be the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
Specically, if the transaction costs are su¢ ciently low such that they will be
paid under A-ownership, c  ~cA( ), then A-ownership also provides maximum
investment incentives, I
A
> maxfIJ ; IB; IJ ; IBg, and is the uniquely optimal
ownership structure. Moreover, if the transaction costs are so high such that they
will not be paid irrespective of the ownership structure, c > maxf~cA( ); ~cJ( )g,
then A-ownership again provides the highest investment incentives, IA > IJ =
IB, and is thus the uniquely optimal ownership structure.
However, as can be seen in Figure 4, there are parameter constellations where
the transaction costs are paid (i.e., the relationship is sustained) only under joint
ownership, maxf~cA( ); ~cB( )g < c  ~cJ( ). Furthermore, there are parameter
constellations where the transaction costs are paid under joint ownership and
under B-ownership, but not under A-ownership, ~cA( ) < c  ~cB( ). In the
former case, joint ownership provides maximum investment incentives, while in
the latter case both joint ownership and B-ownership provide maximum invest-
ment incentives, since I
J
= I
B
> IA > IB. These higher investments translate
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into higher surplus levels only if the transaction costs are not too high, i.e., for
c < ~cS( ). Hence, the optimal ownership structures are as displayed in Figure 4.
Intuitively, what makes joint ownership so unattractive in standard property
rights models is the fact that when no agreement is reached, each party has veto
power so that no surplus is realized. It is precisely this property of joint ownership
that can make it attractive in the case of positive transaction costs, because the
parties will be more inclined to pay the transaction costs when failing to do so
leads to a very undesirable outcome. Since an ex post agreement may thus be
reached under joint ownership but not under A-ownership, joint ownership may
provide stronger investment incentives and turn out to be the optimal ownership
structure.
4 Conclusion
In the past three decades, the property rights approach to the theory of the
rm, pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and
Hart (1995), has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational
economics. While the property rights approach is sometimes regarded as a for-
malization of transaction costs economics, its main focus has been on ex ante
non-contractible investments, while ex post negotiations are assumed to be with-
out frictions. In the present paper, we have introduced explicit transaction costs
in the negotiation stage. It has turned out that the straightforward formalization
of transaction costs as proposed by Anderlini and Felli (2006) is very useful to
enrich the standard property rights model. Even when we keep the standard as-
sumption of equal bargaining powers and assume that both parties have the same
transaction costs (such that in the absence of investment decisions, the ownership
structure that maximizes the sum of the partiesdefault payo¤s is always opti-
mal), prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned.
In particular, depending on the magnitude of the transaction costs, ownership
by a non-investing party and joint ownership can be optimal. The reason that
ownership structures which are suboptimal in standard property rights models
can turn out to be optimal in our setup is the fact that under these ownership
structures the ex post gains from trade are particularly large, which increases
the willingness of the parties to incur the transaction costs in the rst place.
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While Anderlini and Fellis (2006) concise way of modeling transaction costs
ts in nicely with the usual property rights framework that makes use of the Nash
bargaining solution, in future research it might also be interesting to explore the
role of ownership and transaction costs when the negotiations are modelled by
a non-cooperative bargaining game. Specically, Anderlini and Felli (2001) have
introduced transaction costs in an alternating o¤ers bargaining model, and it
could be worthwhile to study the implications of di¤erent property rights allo-
cations in their setup. Moreover, in the present paper we followed the standard
property rights approach by assuming that the parties are symmetrically in-
formed. In future research, we plan to study the role that private information
about transaction costs might play.
Finally, while we have shown that the presence of transaction costs can over-
turn some of the most prominent conclusions of the property rights approach,
we would like to emphasize that our ndings are in support of what one might
consider to be the main insight of the theory developed by Oliver Hart and his
coauthors: Ownership matters. Given that in practice model parameters such
as the magnitude of transaction costs may be constantly changing, the property
rights theory is indeed well in line with the observation that rms are contin-
ually merging and demerging, outsourcing and insourcingas has been pointed
out by Hart (2011, p. 104).
24
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) Suppose that V   cA   cB <  holds. In this case, it cannot be that both
conditions cA  (V   dAA   dAB) and cB  (1   )(V   dAA   dAB) are satised,
because this would imply cA + cB  V   dAA   dAB = V   . Thus, at least one
of the parties does not pay the transaction costs and S(A) =  (see Lemma 1).
Since  > maxf; V   cA   cBg, ownership by agent A leads to a surplus that
is strictly larger than the surplus levels that may be attained under any other
ownership structure. Hence, O = fAg.
(ii) Suppose that V   cA   cB >  holds.
(a) If cA  (V   ) and cB  (1   )(V   ), then both conditions cA 
(V  doA doB) and cB  (1 )(V  doA doB) are satised for all o 2 fA;B; Jg.
Thus, both parties pay the transaction costs and the total surplus is V   cA  cB
under each ownership structure (see Lemma 1). Hence, O = fA;B; Jg.
(b) Suppose (V   ) < cA  (V   ). In this case, cB < V     
cA < (1   )(V   ) must be true. Party A does not pay the transaction costs
under A-ownership since cA > (V   dAA   dAB), hence S(A) = . However,
cA  (V   doA   doB) and cB < (1   )(V   doA   doB) hold for o 2 fB; Jg, so
both parties pay the transaction costs under B-ownership and joint ownership.
Therefore, S(B) = S(J) = V   cA   cB and O = fB; Jg. Analogous arguments
can be made in the case (1  )(V   ) < cB  (1  )(V   ).
(c) Suppose (V   ) < cA  V . In this case, cB < V     cA < (1  )V
must hold. Observe that cA > (V   doA   doB) for o 2 fA;Bg, hence party
A does not pay the transaction costs under these ownership structures. Thus,
S(A) =  and S(B) = . Yet, both parties pay their transaction costs under
joint ownership, because cA  (V  dJA dJB) and cB  (1 )(V  dJA dJB). As
a consequence, S(J) = V   cA   cB and hence O = fJg. Analogous arguments
can be made in the case (1  )(V   ) < cB  (1  )V .
(d) If V < cA, then party A will not pay the transaction costs regardless
of the ownership structure, because cA > (V   doA   doB) for all o 2 fA;B; Jg.
Similarly, if (1   )V < cB, then party B will not pay the transaction costs.
Hence, S(A) = , S(B) = , and S(J) = 0. As a result, O = fAg. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.
A-ownership. With IA = 1, we have uAA(I) = 12(1 + I)(V + )   c   K(I) and
uAA(I) = (1 + I)  K(I). Both uAA(I) and uAA(I) are strictly concave functions
of agent As investment I; i.e., @2uAA(I)=@I
2 = @2uAA(I)=@I
2 =  K 00(I) < 0.
Furthermore, the slope of uAA(I) is strictly larger than the slope of u
A
A(I) for each
investment level; i.e., @uAA(I)=@I =
V+
2
 K 0(I) >  K 0(I) = @uAA(I)=@I. With
@uAA(I)=@IjI=0 > 0, the level of investment IA that globally maximizes uAA(I) is
determined by the rst-order condition @uAA(I
A)=@I = 0 and is given by
K 0(IA) =  () IA =  () : (2)
Likewise, the level of investment I
A
that globally maximizes uAA(I) is determined
by the rst-order condition @uAA(I
A
)=@I = 0 and is given by
K 0(I
A
) =
V + 
2
() IA = 

V + 
2

: (3)
Note that I
A
> IA as 0 > 0.
First, suppose that c  V 
2
. In this case, ~IA := 2c
V    1  0 such that
as outlined in the text both agents are willing to pay the transaction costs
irrespective of agent As investment. Hence, agent A chooses his investment to
maximize uAA(I); i.e., for c  V 2 , agent As optimal investment is IA = I
A
.
Next, suppose that c > V 
2
, such that ~IA > 0. As outlined in the text, both
agents pay the transaction cost c if I  ~IA. If I < ~IA, on the other hand, neither
agent pays the transaction cost c. Observe that
uAA(I
A
) R uAA(IA) () c Q ~cA :=
V   
2
+  

V + 
2

    () ; (4)
where  (x)  (x)x K((x)) with  0(x) = (x) > 0. Furthermore,
~IA > IA () c > cA := V   
2
+
V   
2
 () (5)
and
~IA < I
A () c < cA := V   
2
+
V   
2


V + 
2

: (6)
Comparison of cA and ~cA reveals that
cA < ~cA () V + 
2
>
K(I
A
) K(IA)
I
A   IA
; (7)
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where the latter inequality holds by strict convexity ofK() together withK 0(IA) =
V+
2
. Likewise, comparison of cA and ~cA shows that
cA > ~cA ()  < K(I
A
) K(IA)
I
A   IA
; (8)
where the latter inequality holds by strict convexity ofK() together withK 0(IA) =
. Thus, cA < ~cA < cA. Hence, if c  ~cA and agent A invests IA, then IA > ~IA
such that both agents pay the transaction cost and agent A obtains his largest
possible utility uAA(I
A
). If c > ~cA and agent A invests IA, then IA < ~IA such that
neither agent pays the transaction cost and agent A obtains his largest possible
utility uAA(I
A). Overall, agent As optimal investment is IA = I
A
if V 
2
< c  ~cA
and IA = IA if c > ~cA.
B-ownership. With IA = 0, we have uBA(I) = 12 [(1 + I)V   ]  c K(I) and
uBA(I) =  K(I). Both uBA(I) and uBA(I) are strictly concave functions of agent
As investment I. Furthermore, the slope of uBA(I) is larger for each investment
level than the slope of uBA(I). With @u
B
A(I)=@IjI=0 = 0, the level of investment IB
that globally maximizes uBA(I) is equal to zero, I
B = 0. The level of investment
I
B
that globally maximizes uBA(I), on the other hand, is strictly positive and
determined by the rst-order condition @uBA(I
B
)=@I = 0. Hence,
K 0(I
B
) =
V
2
() IB = 

V
2

: (9)
First, suppose that c  V 
2
. In this case, ~IB := 2c+
V
  1  0 such that both
agents are willing to pay the transaction cost irrespective of agent As investment.
Hence, agent A maximizes uBA(I); i.e., for c  V 2 , agent As optimal investment
is IB = I
B
.
Next, suppose that c > V 
2
, such that ~IB > 0. As outlined in the text, both
agents pay the transaction cost c if I  ~IB. If I < ~IB, on the other hand, neither
agent pays the transaction cost c. Observe that
uBA(I
B
) R uBA(IB) () c Q ~cB :=
V   
2
+  

V
2

: (10)
Furthermore,
~IB > IB () c > cB := V   
2
(11)
and
~IB < I
B () c < cB := V   
2
+
V
2


V
2

: (12)
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Comparison of cB and ~cB reveals that
cB > ~cB ()  K(IB) < 0: (13)
Likewise, comparison of cB and ~cB shows that
cB < ~cB ()  

V
2

=
V
2
I
B  K(IB) > 0; (14)
where the last inequality holds because I
B
= arg maxI0 V2 I  K(I) and K(0) =
0. Thus, cB < ~cB < cB. Hence, if c  ~cB and agent A invests IB, then IB > ~IB
such that both agents pay the transaction cost and agent A obtains his largest
possible utility uBA(I
B
). If c > ~cB and agent A invests IB, then IB < ~IB such that
neither agent pays the transaction cost and agent A obtains his largest possible
utility uBA(I
B). Overall, agent As optimal investment is IB = I
B
if V 
2
< c  ~cB
and IB = IB if c > ~cB.
Joint ownership. The proof for o = J follows in analogy to the proof for
o = B, with   0. Note that ~cJ := V
2
+  
 
V
2

, which, compared to (10), reveals
that ~cJ > ~cB. 
Proof of Lemma 3.
(i) Denote by () = k0 1() the inverse function of k(), where (0) = 0, 0 > 0
and 00  0. Then (x) = K 0 1(x) = 

x
 

. Di¤erentiation of the threshold
~cA( ) =
V   
2
+



V + 
2 

V + 
2
   k



V + 
2 

 




 

   k




 

(15)
with respect to  yields
d~cA( )
d 
=  

k



V + 
2 

  k




 

< 0; (16)
where we made use of the fact that k0((x)) = x. Similarly, di¤erentiation of
~cB( ) =
V   
2
+ 

V
2 

V
2
   k



V
2 

(17)
and
~cJ( ) =
V
2
+ 

V
2 

V
2
   k



V
2 

(18)
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yields
d~cB( )
d 
=
d~cJ( )
d 
=  k



V
2 

< 0: (19)
The statement regarding the respective limit of the thresholds ~cA( ), ~cB( ), and
~cJ( ) as  ! 1 follows from (15), (17), and (18) together with k(0) = 0 and
limx!0 (x) = 0: With
 k



z
 

=
k



z
 

1
 
; (20)
application of LHôpitals rule yields
lim
 !1
 k



z
 

= lim
 !1
z
 
0

z
 

  z
 2

  1
 2
= lim
 !1
z2
 
0

z
 

= 0; (21)
where we made use of the fact that limx!0 
0(x) is bounded above because k00(0) >
0 by assumption.
(ii) The existence of ~ 
AJ
and ~ 
AB
follows from the statement in part (i) regarding
the limits of ~cA( ), ~cB( ), and ~cJ( ) as  ! 1. Finally, ~ AJ  ~ AB follows
from ~cB( ) < ~cJ( ). 
Proof of Lemma 4.
(i) If ~cA( ) < c  ~co( ) with o 2 fB; Jg, then S(A) = (1 + IA)   K(IA),
whereas S(o) = V (1 + I
o
)   2c  K(Io) for o 2 fB; Jg. Recall that IA = (
 
)
and I
o
= ( V
2 
) for o 2 fB; Jg. It follows that S(o) R S(A) if and only if
c Q ~cS( ), where
~cS( ) :=
V   
2
+
1
2



V
2 

V    k



V
2 

  1
2




 

   k




 

: (22)
Di¤erentiation with respect to  yields
d~cS( )
d 
=  1
2

k



V
2 

  k




 

+ 0

V
2 

V 2
4 2

< 0: (23)
Finally, the statement regarding the limit of ~cS( ) as  ! 1 follows from
k(0) = 0, limx!0 (x) = 0, and application of LHôpitals rule.
(ii) With
~cA( ) :=
V   
2
+  

V + 
2

   () (24)
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and
~cS( ) :=
V   
2
+  

V
2

+
1
2
 k



V
2 

  1
2
 (); (25)
we have ~cA( ) < ~cS( ) if and only if
1
2
 k



V
2 

>  

V + 
2

   

V
2

  1
2
 () =: 
(): (26)
Remember that  (x) = (x)x  K((x)) with  = K 0 1 and, hence,  (0) = 0.
Thus, lim!0 
() = 0. Since 12 k



V
2 

> 0, this implies existence of a
critical threshold ~ > 0 such that (26) is satised if  < ~. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
For o 2 fB; Jg, if  >  Ao, then ~cA( ) < ~co( ) by Lemma 3(ii). Furthermore,
~cA( ) < ~cS( ) for  < ~ by Lemma 4(ii). Together these observations imply
that the set Co( ) := fc j ~cA( ) < c < minf~co( ); ~cS( )gg is not empty if
 >  Ao and  < ~. Lemma 4(i) then yields that S(o) > S(A) for all c 2 Co( ).

Proof of Corollary 2.
First, note that for a quadratic investment cost function we have
IA = 
 
, I
A
= V+
2 
,
IB = 0, I
B
= V
2 
,
IJ = 0, I
J
= V
2 
,
and
~cA( ) =
V   
2
+
(V   )(V + 3)
8 
; (27)
~cB( ) =
V   
2
+
V 2
8 
; (28)
~cJ( ) =
V
2
+
V 2
8 
: (29)
Note that @~co( )=@ < 0 and @2~co( )=@ 2 > 0 for all o 2 fA;B; Jg. Also note
that ~cA( ) intersects exactly once with ~cJ( ) and ~cB( ), respectively:
~cA( ) Q ~cJ( ) ()  R ~ AJ := 1
2

V   3
2


(30)
and
~cA( ) Q ~cB( ) ()  R ~ AB := 
  
~ 
AJ
: (31)
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These observations are depicted in Figure 3.
Next, let us derive the total surplus for the di¤erent ownership structures
given agent As optimal investment behavior:
S(A) =
8<: V

1 + V+
2 

  2c   
2

V+
2 
2
if c  ~cA( )


1 + 
 

   
2


 
2
if c > ~cA( )
(32)
S(B) =
8<: V

1 + V
2 

  2c   
2

V
2 
2
if c  ~cB( )
 if c > ~cB( )
(33)
S(J) =
8<: V

1 + V
2 

  2c   
2

V
2 
2
if c  ~cJ( )
0 if c > ~cJ( )
(34)
First, suppose that c  ~cA( ) such that both agents pay the transaction cost
under A-ownership. If c  ~co( ), where o 2 fJ;Bg, then both agents pay the
transaction cost also under o-ownership. Comparison of the upper line in (32)
with the upper line in (33) or (34) shows that S(A) > S(o) holds as V > 
2
by
assumption. If, on the other hand, c > ~co( ), where o 2 fJ;Bg, then c is paid
under A-ownership but not under o-ownership. Comparison of the upper line in
(32) with the lower lines in (33) and (34) yields
S(A) > S(B) () c < ~cA( ) +   
2
+
V (V   2) + 52
16 
(35)
and
S(A) > S(J) () c < ~cA( ) + 
2
+
V (V   2) + 52
16 
: (36)
As c  ~cA( ) by hypothesis, these two conditions are always satised under our
assumptions. Thus, whenever c is paid for A-ownership but not for o-ownership,
where o 2 fB; Jg, then the total surplus is higher under A-ownership than under
o-ownership. Overall, we thus have S(A) > S(o), where o 2 fB; Jg, whenever
c  ~cA( ).
Second, suppose c > maxf~cA( ); ~cJ( )g, such that c is not paid irrespective
of the ownership structure. Comparison of the lower line in (32) with the lower
lines in (33) and (34) shows that S(A) > S(B) > S(J) holds, because 1
2 
2+ >
 > 0.
Finally, suppose that ~cA( ) < c  ~co( ), such that c is paid under o 2 fB; Jg
but not under o = A. Then
S(o) R S(A) () c Q ~cS( ) = V   
2
+
3V 2   42
16 
; (37)
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where @~cS( )=@ < 0 and @2~cS( )=@ 2 > 0. Furthermore, with V > (2 +
p
2)
by assumption, we have ~cS( ) > ~cA( ). Finally, ~cSA( ) intersects exactly once
with ~cJ( ) and ~cB( ), respectively:
~cS( ) R ~cJ( ) ()  Q ~ SJ := V
2   42
8
(38)
and
~cS( ) R ~cB( ) ()  Q ~ SB := 
  
~ 
SJ
; (39)
where, with V > (2 +
p
2), we have ~ 
AJ
< ~ 
SJ
and ~ 
AB
< ~ 
SB
. These
observations are depicted in Figure 4.
It then follows that the sets CJ := f(c;  ) j maxf~cA( ); ~cB( )g < c <
minf~cJ( ); ~cS( )gg and CBJ := f(c;  ) j ~cA( ) < c < minf~cB( ); ~cS( )gg are not
empty. The proof then is completed by the following observations: for c 2 CJ
or c = ~cJ( ) 2 (~cA( ); ~cS( )), we have S(J) > S(A) > S(B); for c 2 CBJ or
c = ~cB( ) 2 (~cA( ); ~cS( )), we have S(J) = S(B) > S(A); for c 2 [~cS( ); ~cJ( )],
S(A)  maxfS(J); S(B)g. 
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